Abstract: Why do Americans' priorities for combating risks like terrorism, climate change, and violent crime often seem so uncorrelated with the dangers that those risks objectively present? Many scholars believe the answer to this question is that heuristics, biases, and ignorance cause voters to misperceive risk magnitudes. By contrast, this paper argues that Americans' risk priorities primarily reflect judgments about the extent to which some victims deserve more protection than others and the degree to which it is appropriate for government to intervene in different areas of social life. The paper supports this argument with evidence drawn from a survey with 3,000 respondents, using pairwise comparisons to elicit novel measures of how respondents perceive nine dimensions of 100 life-threatening risks. Respondents were well-informed about these risks' relative magnitudes -the correlation between perceived and actual mortality was 0.82 -but those perceptions explained relatively little variation in policy preferences relative to judgments about the status of victims and the appropriate role of government. These findings hold regardless of political party, education, and other demographics. The paper thus argues that the key to understanding Americans' divergent reactions to risk lies more with their values than with their grasp of factual information.
Priorities for Preventive Action
The U.S. government spends over $100 billion per year fighting terrorism, a risk that kills about as many Americans as lightning strikes and accidents involving home appliances (Mueller and Stewart 2016) . President Trump has said that one of his primary objectives is reducing violent crime, even though this problem is at historic lows nationwide (Lee 2017) . Meanwhile, the looming threat of climate change could cause vast global harm. Extreme weather induced by global warming may already kill more Americans than terrorists do (Mann et al. 2017 ), yet preventing climate change consistently ranks near the bottom of voters' policy priorities (Egan and Mullin 2017) .
What explains Americans' divergent reactions to risk? In particular, why do Americans' priorities for reducing risk often seem so uncorrelated with the danger that those risks objectively present? Many scholars believe the answer to this question is that heuristics, biases, and ignorance cause voters to misperceive risk magnitudes (e.g., Slovic 2000; Loewenstein et al. 2001; Posner 2004; Sunstein 2004; Gigerenzer 2006; Mueller 2006; Gadarian 2010; Slovic 2010; Weber and Stern 2011; Meyer and Kunreuther 2017) . Efforts to raise awareness of issues like climate change (IPCC 2015) , opioids (Quinones 2016) , artificial intelligence (Bostrom 2014) , and pandemic disease (Garrett 2000) all assume that voters would assign these issues greater priority if they understood the extent of the damage these problems could cause. By the same token, efforts to combat alarmist views of terrorism (Mueller and Stewart 2016) , nuclear power (Weart 2012) , and violent crimes committed by immigrants (Nowrasteh 2016) assume that voters would assign these issues less priority if they did not exaggerate the magnitude of those problems. This research connects to a broad literature arguing that misinformation, media bias, and lack of political knowledge skew the allocation of public resources (Delli Carpini and Keeter 1996; Althaus 1998; Achen and Bartels 2016; Lupia 2016 ).
Yet scholars possess a limited basis for understanding how misperceptions shape responses to risk. The first section of this paper explains how much of the existing literature on risk attitudes does not explicitly distinguish between factual beliefs and policy preferences, let alone examine the extent to which the former shapes the latter across issues. There are also reasons to believe that voters should be better-informed about risk magnitudes than other kinds of political knowledge.
Whereas most politically-relevant facts do not directly impact citizens' daily lives, risk perceptions have been harmed in terrorist attacks. To the extent that voters are more likely to support directing government resources to counterterrorism rather than traffic safety, it is hard to believe this results from the mistaken impression that terrorists kill more Americans than motorists do. This paper instead argues that Americans' risk priorities reflect value judgments, particularly regarding the extent to which some victims deserve more protection than others and the degree to which it is (in)appropriate for government to intervene in different areas of social life. These subjective beliefs shape the perceived benefits and costs of government spending in ways that go beyond objective metrics like lives saved or dollars spent. The paper backs this argument with evidence drawn from a survey of 3,000 Americans, using pairwise comparisons to elicit novel measures of how respondents perceive nine dimensions of 100 life-threatening risks. In explicitly distinguishing between respondents' risk perceptions and policy priorities across a large and principled universe of cases, this is the most systematic study of its kind to date.
The data show that respondents accurately perceived the relative magnitudes of life-threatening risks: the correlation between perceived and actual mortality across the 100 risks in this study was 0.82 (df=98, p<0.001 ). Yet, consistent with the paper's theoretical argument, perceptions of objective harm explained less variation in respondents' policy priorities than judgments regarding the status of victims and the appropriate role of government. These findings hold regardless of partisanship, education, and other demographics. We will thus see that Republicans and Democrats both hold relatively accurate perceptions of which risks cause more harm than others, but neither affords those perceptions much weight when considering how to allocate public funds.
For example, even though respondents assigned terrorism the third-highest priority among risks covered by the survey, they did not see this problem as being particularly deadly. On this measure, terrorism ranked 51 st out of 100 risks, around the same level as bicycle accidents and tornadoes.
Instead, respondents said that terrorism was exceptionally unfair to its victims (ranked #2, behind only child abuse) and that governments have special obligations to protect citizens from this danger (again #2, behind only nuclear war). Reasonable people can disagree on these matters, but that is also the point: the judgments that best predict respondents' risk priorities do not lend themselves to clear standards of correctness, and they have little to do with the heuristics and biases that scholars often use to explain Americans' divergent reactions to risk.
These findings raise further questions about how voters form subjective judgments regarding the status of victims and government's normative obligations. It is of course possible that those judgments reflect other attributes, or that voters use these judgments retrospectively to justify policies that they support for other reasons. It is nevertheless important to understand that these are the terms voters use to defend their risk priorities. The main reason that voters are so concerned with risks like terrorism and violent crime is not because they think these problems are especially common, but because they say these problems are especially objectionable. Should one still see these priorities as misguided, the key to productive discourse likely lies in understanding voters'
values rather than contesting their factual beliefs (cf. Douglas and Wildavsky 1982; Page and Shapiro 1992; Gastil et al. 2011; Haidt 2012; Kahan 2015) .
Separating risk perceptions and policy priorities
Most of the U.S. federal budget is devoted to protecting citizens from risk. In fiscal year 2016, for example, 30% of federal spending funded health care, 24% supported national security, and 23%
financed Social Security. 1 The remaining 23% of federal funds included programs for law enforcement, flood mitigation, fire prevention, unemployment insurance, environmental protection, food assistance, and interest paid on debts accrued from previous risk-reducing expenditures. Understanding how voters' perceptions of risk shape priorities for public spending is thus crucial to understanding how government functions in the United States and in most other developed countries.
Yet scholars do not always draw clear distinctions between risk perceptions and policy preferences. Surveys measuring risk attitudes often focus on understanding which risks "worry"
or "concern" respondents to different degrees or why respondents see some dangers as being "riskier" than others (e.g., Finucane et al. 2000; Huddy et al. 2005; Howe et al. 2015; Kahan 2015) .
1 Unless otherwise noted, all figures in this paper regarding mortality and public spending come from U.S. government statistics, documented in Supplementary Sections 11-12.
While these surveys offer crucial insights for understanding risk as a psychological construct, they do not directly capture how respondents perceive objective danger or how they prefer the government to allocate scarce resources.
Polling on terrorism, for instance, consistently shows that roughly half of Americans are "very worried" or "somewhat worried" that someone in their families will be killed in a terrorist attack.
Yet a majority of Americans also consistently say that terrorist attacks are "not too likely" or "not at all likely" in the short run, and terrorism typically ranks low in polls asking voters to identify the most important problems facing the country today (Mueller and Stewart 2016, 81-88) .
"Worrying" about terrorism thus says little, by itself, about respondents' factual perceptions or their policy priorities, let alone how the former shapes the latter.
Voters can also justifiably prioritize risks they know to be objectively small. For example, one of the most contentious issues in contemporary U.S. politics is whether Americans should have the right to own assault rifles. The political attention this issue receives is disproportionate to the mortality that assault rifles cause (roughly 100-200 deaths per year). It is possible that some people feel so strongly about this risk because they overestimate its magnitude (Beckett 2014) . But even if gun control advocates understand that assault rifles cause relatively few deaths, they might believe those deaths are so odious that the government should remove assault weapons from circulation. Some voters may also favor assault weapons legislation in order to build momentum towards broader gun control. Showing that voters worry about assault weapons or favor their restriction thus says little about how they perceive the danger that these weapons pose.
These examples demonstrate the need to separate risk perceptions from policy preferences in order to understand public responses to risk, and furthermore to separate perceptions of objective harm from subjective beliefs about why some risks deserve greater priority than others. Given the demands of collecting these data, scholars often focus their research on salient risks like terrorism (Lerner et al. 2003) , climate change (Egan and Mullin 2017) , and gun ownership (Kahan and Braman 2003) . These studies provide rigorous insight into controversial issues -yet precisely because these issues are unusually controversial, they may not reflect how the public sets risk priorities writ large. In order to understand Americans' divergent reactions to risk, researchers must analyze factual beliefs, value judgments, and policy priorities across a universe of cases that can sustain general inference. The next two sections describe a conceptual framework and a survey methodology designed to meet these criteria.
The paper focuses specifically on attitudes towards life-threatening problems, otherwise known as "public risks" (Keeney 1980 ). This excludes economic risks and programs designed solely for environmental protection, though environmental issues fall within the analysis as they relate to health and safety. This scope condition serves a theoretical purpose, as the next section explains why voters have special incentives and opportunities to gather information about life-threatening matters. Though limiting the analysis to public risk entails some loss of generality, the study still covers a broad range of issues which occupy the majority of U.S. government expenditures. Citizens also have more opportunities to gather information about public risk than other kinds of politically-relevant facts. In some areas of politics, citizens' access to information depends almost entirely on media and elites. This dependence fosters bias and manipulation (Page and Shapiro 1992, 355-382) , and similar dynamics can shape perceptions of risk as well (Pidgeon et al. 2003; Sunstein 2004, 89-107; Gadarian 2010 political attention, such as infant mortality (23,000 deaths), falling (33,000 deaths), and suicide (45,000 deaths). In order for factual misperceptions to explain the mismatch between risk magnitudes and public spending, those misperceptions must be consistently enormous. This is, of course, possible -but it could also be the case that Americans prefer to spend greater amounts of money fighting terrorism relative to other public risks because they see these dangers as being qualitatively distinct in ways that go beyond actuarial data.
Subjective determinants of risk priorities
There are three main reasons why voters' risk priorities need not correlate with perceptions of objective harm. First, voters may believe that some victims deserve more protection than others.
For example, the mortality rate among motorcyclists is far larger than the probability that a randomly-chosen American will be killed by a terrorist. Yet motorcyclists knowingly accept risk, whereas terrorists' victims bear no responsibility for their deaths. It is therefore reasonable to believe that government should prioritize counterterrorism over motorcycle safety, even with the knowledge that terrorism claims many fewer lives.
A substantial volume of research confirms that perceptions of agency shape citizens' willingness to tolerate public risk. Risks that seem inequitably distributed, that cause intense pain and suffering, or that result from malign actions also tend to provoke special concern (Fischhoff et al. 1981; Slovic 2000; Viscusi 2010) . From a practical standpoint, we can combine these attributes into judgments about the degree to which risks are unfair to their victims. A second value judgment that can shape voters' risk priorities is thus the degree to which government bears a responsibility to protect citizens from some risks over others. Voters may see this responsibility as being especially high in cases where citizens cannot protect themselves from risks without government assistance, as with providing clean drinking water or maintaining safe infrastructure. Voters may also see the government as bearing special responsibilities to protect citizens from risks that have potentially-irreversible consequences (e.g., climate change) or risks that affect society at large (e.g., pandemic disease).
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It is important to note that the government's "responsibility to protect" citizens from harm is not synonymous with voters' preferences for public spending themselves. Saying that government bears a responsibility to prevent crime, for instance, does not mean that law enforcement should occupy huge fractions of the federal budget. In practice, law enforcement is indeed largely delegated to individual cities and states. Similarly, there is no contradiction in arguing that the government bears responsibility for maintaining nuclear defenses while also arguing that the country should cut the cost of its nuclear arsenal. 4 The reluctance of many voters to support humanitarian interventions abroad provides a particularly vivid example how a perceived responsibility to protect people from harm does not imply willingness to take costly action.
Perceptions of harm, fairness, and governmental responsibility establish a basic framework for describing how the public evaluates risk-reducing programs. Though these factors are not necessarily orthogonal to each other, the purpose of this discussion is to establish that these attributes can vary independently and that each carries distinct policy implications. The degree to which voters actually draw these distinctions in practice -and the extent to which those distinctions actually explain independent variation in voters' risk priorities -are empirical questions which the paper examines below. Supplementary material provides additional analysis of how survey respondents justified their beliefs regarding fairness and responsibility in different ways.
5 4 Indeed, this study's respondents ranked nuclear war #1 out of 100 risks with respect to the responsibility that government bears for protecting its citizens but 21 st in priorities for public spending, beneath dozens of risks that currently receive far fewer federal resources.
5 These data show that respondents were more likely to justify judgments of fairness based on victims' ability to control their risk exposure; on whether the risk was deliberately inflicted on victims; and on whether the risk caused extreme pain and suffering. By contrast, respondents were more likely to say that the government bears responsibility for reducing risks that affect cancer on an annual basis, let alone over any sustained period. It is therefore difficult to justify the imbalance of spending between these domains based on health and safety alone, even when assigning substantial weight to low-probability, high-consequence scenarios.
Similarly, few risks have enough growth potential to approach the top of the mortality rankings if they are not there already. Over the past fifteen years, for instance, the number of Americans who die annually from abusing opioids has increased from roughly 15,000 to 35,000. This trend is widely seen as one of the country's greatest health crises. Yet opioids remain less deadly than
Alzheimer's disease, bacterial infections, and kidney disorders, none of which receives anywhere near the same level of political attention. Thirty-five thousand deaths is about the annual mortality from firearms -a risk that is also largely concentrated among otherwise-healthy citizens -yet many Americans strongly oppose government intervention to prevent gun violence. Victims of previous spikes in drug fatalities, such as the crack cocaine epidemic in the 1980s, received much less public sympathy than Americans afflicted by opioids today. None of this means that the country's current concern for opioids is misguided, only that this case reflects how Americans' risk priorities appear to depend on judgments that some populations deserve more protection than others, or that the government's responsibility to protect citizens from risk does not correlate with objective danger. The next section describes a survey that tests the extent to which similar patterns characterize Americans' broader reactions to 100 public risks.
Eliciting risk attitudes through pairwise comparisons
The survey analyzed throughout the remainder of this paper elicited risk attitudes through pairwise comparisons, presenting respondents with two randomly-chosen risks at a time and asking them to say which one exceeded the other along a specified dimension. This approach offers several advantages over traditional rating scales.
One such advantage is that pairwise comparisons force respondents to make tradeoffs. Rating scales, by contrast, allow respondents to defer tough choices by saying that multiple items all pose maximum threat or top priority. Of course, pairwise comparisons only elicit relational judgments.
Thus, even if respondents perfectly understood which risks caused more harm than others, they could still over-or underestimate the absolute magnitude of these dangers. But subjective rating scales do not solve this problem either. Since assessments of "worry," "concern," and "riskiness"
do not lend themselves to clear standards of correctness, these measures also serve primarily to elicit relative rankings. Researchers can only study absolute perceptions of risk by eliciting numeric judgments of objectively-measurable quantities. This is possible for eliciting perceptions of frequency or probability, but not for eliciting the kinds of subjective beliefs that are crucial to this paper's theoretical framework.
We can use these pairwise comparisons to construct indices of aggregate opinion based on the proportion of the time that each risk "wins" head-to-head comparisons against randomly-chosen alternatives. These easily-interpretable measures are guaranteed to have identical means (0.50) and they tend to possess similar variances. 6 Because these indices' means are fixed, they automatically control for differences in how respondents define measurement units. 7 Pairwise comparisons eliminate the need to define new rating scales each time the survey analyzes a different dimension of risk. Perhaps most crucially for the purposes of this study, pairwise comparisons minimize cognitive load, allowing researchers to examine a broad range of topics within a single survey.
The universe of cases for this study contained 100 public risks, including all 69 risks that killed at least 1,000 Americans in 2015 according to federal data. 8 It is also important to consider risks that could plausibly harm large numbers of Americans, such as war, terrorism, and climate change.
Here there is more ambiguity surrounding inclusion criteria, and so the study relied on the enumeration of "catastrophic risks" in reviews by Posner (2004) , Sunstein (2007) , and Bostrom and Cirkovic (2011). 9 In explicitly distinguishing between risk perceptions and policy priorities across such a broad range of risks, this study offers the most systematic analysis of its kind to date. showing how these patterns hold across subgroups of respondents and risks.
Survey design
The survey contained four modules. Each module asked respondents to complete fifteen pairwise comparisons with respect to one of the nine randomly-chosen attributes shown in Figure   8 Mortality estimates primarily come from the Centers for Disease Control. Supplementary Section 14 provides documentation.
9 Again, see Supplementary Section 14 for documentation.
1. The content and ordering of these pairs were fully randomized, both within and across modules.
There was thus no guarantee that any two respondents would evaluate the same pair of risks, nor that a respondent would assess the same risk in multiple survey modules. This randomization reduced potential for contamination across survey questions, and there is no evidence that such contamination occurred: all findings hold when limiting data to the first module of pairwise comparisons that each respondent completed.
Figure 1. Questions used to generate risk indices
The study's primary dependent variable (Priority) reflects respondents' judgments of which risks the U.S. government should spend more total money to reduce. 10 A different version of this question (Priority-margin) asked how respondents would prefer the U.S. government to spend an extra $1 billion. These measures were almost perfectly correlated across risks (corr=0.96, df=98,
p<0.001).
11 This correlation shows that respondents did not support allocating resources to objectively-small risks simply because they believe major expenditures are necessary to keep those risks low. Even after reducing risks like terrorism and homicide to their current levels, respondents still thought that those issues deserved higher priority than other problems that harm more people.
Another survey module asked respondents to say which risks caused more harm to Americans last year (Harm), along with the more objective question of which risks killed more Americans last year (Mortality). Additional survey modules asked which risks are more unfair to the people they harm (Fairness) and which risks the U.S. government bears more responsibility for reducing (Responsibility). 12 The survey measured perceptions of Disaster potential by asking respondents to select risks that could cause more harm to Americans in a particularly disastrous year (cf. Slovic 2000, 117), and elicited perceptions of Long-term growth by asking which risks are more likely to 10 Survey instructions emphasized that this referred to spending by the federal government.
11 As mentioned above, survey indices reflect the proportion of cases in which a risk "beat" randomly-chosen alternatives.
12 Survey instructions again emphasized that this question pertained to the federal government specifically.
get worse in the future. Finally, to replicate previous measures of self-reported anxiety, the study asked respondents to say which risks worried them more (Worry).
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Qualtrics administered the survey online to 3,000 Americans of voting age. 14 Respondents approximated national averages on most key demographics: they were 50% female, 62% white, 16% Hispanic, and 13% black, balanced according to census proportions by age and region, with a median household income of roughly $60,000. The sample skewed slightly liberal, with 27%
identifying as Republicans and 36% identifying as Democrats. The sample also had disproportionately high levels of formal education, with 53% of respondents reporting that they held a college degree. Empirical analyses adjust for these imbalances by applying survey weights, but all results hold when analyzing unweighted data.
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With 3,000 respondents making 60 pairwise comparisons apiece, and with each pairwise comparison providing information on two risks, the survey produced an average of 400 observations per attribute for all 100 risks in the data set. Median survey completion time was 12.6 minutes. The data show no signs of survey fatigue: for example, we will see that the accuracy of respondents' mortality rankings did not decline across survey modules.
It is important to emphasize that empirical relationships among this survey's responses are correlational, not causal. Thus, the survey cannot distinguish between determinants of respondents' policy preferences as opposed to retrospective justifications. Yet the absence of 13 Supplementary Section 9 presents correlation matrices.
14 Supplementary Section 3 presents the full survey instrument and additional logistical details. 15 Supplementary Section 3 presents details on survey weights, estimated based on gender, race, age, income, census division, and party.
experimental manipulation does not impede testing the paper's main claims. If respondents reverse-engineered perceptions of harm to match their policy preferences, that should make these perceptions less accurate and more correlated with their risk priorities. By contrast, the next two sections shows that respondents' perceptions of harm were accurate but also weakly correlated with their preferences for public spending relative to value judgments about the status of victims and the appropriate role of government. 
Analyzing perceptions of mortality and harm

p<0.001).
Gaps between these measures do not appear to reflect unjustified fears so much as sensible judgments about risks that cause substantial economic damage (e.g., cyberattacks) or that severely impact victims' quality of life (e.g., post-traumatic stress disorder). Figure 4a shows that the accuracy of respondents' mortality rankings did not substantially vary by demographics, education, or political orientation. This figure presents an ordinary least squares regression with robust standard errors, in which the dependent variable is the proportion of correct answers that each respondent gave when making mortality comparisons. On average, respondents answered 72% of these comparisons correctly (sd=14%). Only 8% of respondents failed to give the right answer at least half of the time. The accuracy of respondents' mortality rankings appears statistically unrelated to partisanship, gender, and college education. The strongest predictor of response accuracy in Figure 4a is ordinary science intelligence (OSI), a measure reflecting respondents' capacity to employ scientific evidence in everyday decision-making (Kahan 2017) . A one-standard deviation increase in OSI predicts a five percentage-point increase in response accuracy, which amounts to just 7% of baseline performance. The last row in Figure 4a further demonstrates that response accuracy was unrelated to the module in which respondents made mortality comparisons. We thus see no evidence of fatigue degrading respondents' performance over the course of the survey.
Figure 4b presents another ordinary least squares regression with robust standard errors, analyzing response accuracy across risks (mean=72%, sd=9%). 16 The model includes indicators for whether each risk fell into five nonexclusive categories. Results show that respondents consistently understood that natural disasters and existential risks cause relatively low mortality.
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By contrast, respondents showed no consistent tendency to provide (in)accurate answers when judging the mortality associated with violent risks, environmental risks, or health risks.
The last two coefficients in Figure 4b capture a U-shaped relationship between response accuracy and actual mortality. As supplementary material describes in more detail, respondents provided their most accurate responses when ranking risks that cause either very high or very low numbers of annual deaths. This is intuitive, as such risks offer starker contrasts to randomly-chosen 16 This variable measures the proportion of the time that respondents correctly answered pairwise comparisons involving each risk in the data set.
17 "Existential" risks like climate change and nuclear war could cause permanent, large, negative consequences to humanity which can never be undone (Bostrom and Cirkovic 2011) .
alternatives. Yet the data also reveal that this relationship does not capture substantial variation.
When respondents made pairwise comparisons involving risks that lie at the bottom of this curve (corresponding to risks that cause roughly 1,000 annual deaths) they still gave correct answers 69% of the time, compared to their 72% success rate overall.
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Altogether, these results demonstrate that survey respondents essentially equated the harm that public risks cause with mortality; that they could rank these risks according to mortality in a reasonably accurate manner; and that the accuracy of these rankings was relatively consistent across demographics, education, political orientation, and risk type. There is no evidence here of the kinds of major informational deficiencies that scholars often find when measuring the public's grasp of other politically-relevant information. Yet the next section will show that, even if respondents held reasonable perceptions of which risks cause more harm than others, those perceptions explain little variation in policy priorities compared to judgments about the status of victims and the appropriate role of government. Respondents' perceptions of harm were not correlated with other variables in ways that conceal their predictive value in multivariate regression. Figure 6 shows instead that the Harm index is a relatively weak predictor of risk priorities which cannot account for substantial, explainable variance. On the left-hand side of Figure 6 , for example, we see that respondents' preferences for public spending on counterterrorism are far higher than what we would predict based on their perceptions of the harm that terrorism causes. By contrast, the right-hand side of Figure 6 shows that support for counterterrorism expenditures almost exactly matches expectations once we account for respondents' perceptions of fairness and governmental responsibility.
Analyzing priorities for public spending
19 See Supplementary Section 6.
Exploring heterogeneity in risk priorities
The paper previously explained that one advantage of eliciting risk attitudes through pairwise comparisons is that all survey indices are guaranteed to have means of 0.50. This automatically controls for respondent fixed effects in the analyses that Figures 5 and 6 present. For instance, Democrats might generally see risks as being more unfair to their victims and they could generally be more willing to spend public funds promoting health and safety. But since a tendency to rate risks at different levels on absolute scales will not influence the results of pairwise comparisons, this cannot confound analyses of covariation among the paper's survey indices. The remainder of this section thus explores two other kinds of heterogeneity that are more relevant to understanding why respondents prefer the government to protect them from some risks over others.
The first of these concerns involves heterogeneity in perceptions, which is the idea that measures of collective public opinion could conceal systematic variation in respondents' beliefs.
For example, the data reveal a partisan split when evaluating the U.S. government's responsibility for combating climate change (ranked #13 out of 100 risks for Democrats versus #33 for Republicans) and how much priority this risk deserves (#6 for Democrats versus #69 for Republicans). Survey data also show a racial split when assessing the degree to which lethal force used by police is unfair to its victims (#59 for whites versus #15 for non-whites), which again correlates with a large gap in spending preferences (#58 for whites vs. #6 for non-whites). Another concern involves heterogeneity in conceptual frameworks, which is the idea that respondents could weight attributes differently when setting their risk priorities. It is especially important to demonstrate that the coefficients in Figure 5 reflect general patterns across survey respondents rather than the views of specific subgroups.
The most straightforward way to address these concerns is to divide the data into subsets and then to replicate the analysis from the ground up. Thus, we can take survey responses provided by Republicans, whites, or any other group of respondents; re-estimate survey indices based on pairwise comparisons drawn from those respondents alone; and replicate the prior analysis of risk priorities. Supplementary material presents such analyses for fifteen respondent groups, divided by political party, education, gender, race, ordinary science intelligence, and ideology. Each of these analyses yields findings similar to those presented in Figure 5 : perceptions of harm always explain limited variation in respondents' policy preferences relative to judgments of fairness and governmental responsibility.
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The survey data support a more formal demonstration of this point via two-stage logit analysis.
The first stage analyzes how risk attitudes vary across respondents based on the six indicator variables specified in Equation 1. 21 This logit model estimates the probability that respondent i will select risk j over randomly-chosen alternatives along dimension k. These predicted probabilities are conceptually similar to the survey indices presented earlier in this paper, which also measure the probability that each risk "beats" randomly-chosen alternatives in pairwise comparisons.
20 See Supplementary Section 7. 21 The i indicator takes a value of 1 if respondents scored above the mean on ordinary science intelligence.
The second stage in this analysis uses fitted i,j,k values to predict the probability that a risk beats randomly-chosen alternatives in pairwise comparisons of Priority. This is again conceptually similar to the analysis presented in Figure 5 , but now instead of using ordinary least squares regression with one observation per risk, we can fit a logit model to every pairwise comparison in which each risk appeared (N=39,810). 22 Furthermore, instead of assigning each risk a single value reflecting collective opinion on dimensions like Harm or Long-term growth, the i,j,k terms capture heterogeneity in respondents' perceptions. Figure 7a presents results estimated from 1,500 bootstrap samples, clustered by respondent and stratified by risk.
23
22 Thus, if a respondent indicates that terrorism deserved a higher priority for public spending than climate change, we record this as a "1" for terrorism and a "0" for climate change.
Structuring the data in this way mirrors the analysis of win probabilities in Figure 5 , while continuing to guarantee that the dependent variable will have a mean of 0.50. 23 The bootstrap algorithm thus selects a random sample of respondents with replacement from each survey module before running the 600 regressions that generate the i,j,k estimates. Logit coefficients with 95% intervals (N=39,810 judgments)
Though Figure 7a captures much more granular data than the analysis of collective opinion shown in Figure 5 , the results are substantively similar. Perceptions of harm remain relatively weak predictors of respondents' policy preferences, while perceptions of fairness and responsibility still carry the largest coefficients among the six survey indices. The confidence intervals in this analysis are now smaller given the increased sample size, and perceptions of disaster potential now predict respondents' risk priorities whereas this term had previously been statistically-insignificant. But these are the only ways in which accounting for heterogeneity in perceptions alters our understanding of respondents' risk priorities.
We can incorporate heterogeneity in conceptual frameworks into this analysis through the use of interaction terms. If Democrats place special weight on perceptions of harm when setting risk priorities, for example, that should result in a positive coefficient on an interaction term combining the i,j index with an indicator for Democratic party identification. The coefficient remaining on the i,j index would then reflect the general relationship between perceptions of harm and risk priorities, over and above any special weight that Democrats assign to this attribute. 24 Figure   7b extends this logic to include interaction terms for both Democratic and Republican identification, combined with each index used to predict respondents' policy priorities. 24 Note that indicators for Democratic identification (or any other respondent-level attribute)
cannot capture meaningful variation in average win probability themselves, as this mean is guaranteed to be 0.50.
All twelve interaction terms shown in Figure 7b fall outside the p<0.05 significance threshold. 
Conclusion
Promoting health and safety is arguably a government's foremost obligation. In the United States and other developed countries, combating risk is also the principal justification for spending government funds. Allocating those funds requires making contentious tradeoffs, as any dollar spent fighting risks like terrorism, violent crime, and climate change cannot be devoted to other problems. Setting these priorities -determining whom to protect and from what -is one of the basic challenges of democratic governance (Douglas and Wildavsky 1982; Viscusi 1992) .
By explicitly distinguishing between risk perceptions and policy priorities across 100 public risks, this paper showed that Americans are generally well-informed about which risks cause more harm than others. To the extent that voters' preferences for public spending do not correlate with the danger that these risks objectively present, this does not appear to reflect misperceptions of risk magnitudes in the way that a broad range of scholarship expects. Instead, the paper showed that Americans' risk priorities are best predicted by value judgments like the degree to which some victims deserve more protection than others and the extent to which it is appropriate for government to intervene in different areas of social life.
It is important to take these subjective beliefs seriously both in scholarly analyses and in policy debates. When people disagree in setting policy priorities, they often attribute their opponents' positions to ignorance or misinformation. This paper also provides foundations for further research exploring how public opinion shapes government spending (cf. Bartels 1991; Hartley and Russett 1992; Wlezien 1996) . In some cases -as with terrorism, which ranked third on respondents' spending priorities -federal expenditures align with voters' demands. But that correlation is imperfect. Cancer and heart disease were the top two policy priorities for this survey's respondents. Air pollution placed sixth. Warfare ranked 24 th on respondents' risk-reduction priorities, beneath diabetes, prescription drug abuse, and HIV/AIDS. Thus to the extent that the defense budget crowds out spending on health care, that does not appear to be a straightforward function of voters' policy preferences. 29 By advancing a new approach to analyzing those preferences across a broad range of issues, this paper is relevant 28 Supplementary Section 10 presents results from a follow-up survey with 500 respondents that provides some initial steps in this direction. It is also important to assess the extent to which these value judgments are stable and coherent: for instance, to what extent these judgments appear susceptible to the kinds of framing effects that often appear in attitudes towards public spending (Jacoby 2000; Druckman 2002 ). The more stability and coherence these judgments exhibit, the more weight one might be inclined to afford those judgments when setting policy priorities (Page and Shapiro 1992; Diamond and Hausman 1994) . 29 The American National Election Study and the General Social Survey also consistently show that Americans are less supportive of increasing expenditures for defense than for health care, environmental protection, and many other public goods.
not just to understanding the public's spending priorities in their own right, but also for understanding how and why the federal budget reflects some of these priorities more than others. 
